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Abstract  
 
This paper discusses the development of Marx’s thought over a period of 
something like fifteen months, between the spring of 1843 and the autumn of 
1844. The focus of the paper is Marx’s first encounter with classical political 
economy as he found it in the Wealth of Nations. The outcome of this encounter 
was presented by Marx in his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. 
It is argued here that in the classical theory, with which he had hitherto been 
largely unfamiliar, Marx found all the elements he needed to synthesise the 
philosophical standpoint he had developed in the preceding months with political 
economy. The Manuscripts  represent the first crucial stage in the development of 
this synthesis. This first encounter of Marx with classical political economy, and 
his first steps in the development of his synthesis, have received hardly any 
attention in the literature. The present paper seeks to fill this gap.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
Marx turned to the study of political economy in 1844 after he had 
completed his critique of Hegel’s political philosophy and adopted his 
own philosophical standpoint. The Hegel critique had involved both 
acceptance and rejection. What he had taken from Hegel was the organic 
conception of society, a denial of the principle of individualism or social 
atomism, and the notion of the self-evolving nature of the historical 
process. What he rejected was Hegel’s idealism.  
 
Marx’s critique of Hegel and the early development of his own standpoint 
will be discussed in some detail presently. Here it is sufficient to say that 
Marx had come to the realisation that religious and political alienation
1
 
were particular forms of a more general phenomenon that arose out of the 
material conditions of civil society. It was the need to elucidate this 
conclusion and give it a firm basis that brought Marx to the study of 
political economy. Fifteen years later, in the often-quoted ‘Preface’ to A 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx recalled this 
critical period (1843-44) in his intellectual development: ‘The first work 
which I undertook for a solution of the doubts which assailed me was a 
critical review of the Hegelian philosophy of right [law]
2
, a work the 
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 The meaning of the term ‘alienation’ as used in this paper will become clear as we proceed.  
2
 Hegel’s Philosophie des Rechts is translated by some writers as ‘philosophy of right’ and others as 
‘philosophy of law’. Marx-Engels (1975, vol. 3) translates as ‘law’, Marx-Engels (1958) as ‘right’.  
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introduction to which appeared in 1844 in the Deutsch-Franzoesische 
Jahrbuecher, published in Paris. My investigations led to the result that 
legal relations as well as forms of state are to be grasped neither from 
themselves nor from the so-called general development of the human 
mind, but rather have their roots in the material conditions of life, the sum 
total of which Hegel …combines under the name of ‘civil society’, that, 
however, the anatomy of civil society is to be sought in political 
economy.’3  
 
These further investigations consisted of extensive studies in political 
economy, carried out in Paris in the spring and summer of 1844, and an 
attempt to synthesise his philosophical standpoint with political economy. 
The outcome of these studies was the notes published as The Economic 
and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844.
4
   
 
As mentioned, Marx read extensively; the authors he refers to and 
comments on include J. B. Say, Adam Smith, David Ricardo, James Mill, 
J. R. McCulloch, Jeremy Bentham, Destut de Tracy, E. Buret, W. Schulz, 
Lauderdale, Sismondi, Francois Quesnay and others. But the author with 
whose work he engages most intimately and who provides the main 
source of the synthesis is Adam Smith. This fact has remained largely 
unnoticed in the literature on the subject.
5
 By and large, the quotations 
from other writers are used by way of illustrations or reinforcements of 
the points being made. The beginning of Marx’s critique of classical 
political economy, through acceptance as well as rejection (as was the 
case with the critique of Hegel), is to be found here with his first 
encounter with classical political economy as expounded in the Wealth of 
Nations. We have here the remarkable fact, that Marx, whose life’s work 
would generate the greatest mass movement against capitalism since the 
latter’s inception, should have found the first source of his economic 
thought in the work of an author who is almost universally regarded as 
the prophet of the free-market, capitalist philosophy.   
 
The publication of the Manuscripts in full for the first time, in the original 
German, in 1932, and particularly after the appearance of the English 
edition in 1959, led to a wide-ranging debate among political 
philosophers and students of Marxism on the significance of this work in 
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4
  Marx-Engels (1975, vol. 3: 229-346); for the background to the writing of the Manuscripts, see note 
on pages 598-99. 
5
 One respected biographer of Marx attributes to the German writer Wilhelm Schulz the major 
influence on Marx. He writes: ‘The economic sections of the Manuscripts show the influence of Schulz 
more than any other writer.’  See McLellen (1977), p. 107. See also the editorial note in Marx-Engels 
(1975, 3: xvii)   
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Marx’s overall thought, and the relationship between this work of the 
‘young Marx’ with that of the ‘mature Marx’.6 Political philosophers 
have naturally directed their attention to the philosophical aspects of 
Marx’s thought, with very little attention to the economic aspects of the 
work; and where some thought has been given to issues relating to 
political economy, there has been no recognition of the unique impact 
that Adam Smith had on the development of Marx’s thought. 7 In the 
economic literature on Marx, it is of course now widely accepted that 
Marx’s formal economics falls neatly within the frame of classical 
political economy.
8
 It is however the case that this first encounter of 
Marx with classical political economy has hardly received any 
recognition in the literature on the history of economic thought.
9
 This is 
perhaps due to the fact that historians of economic thought generally deal 
exclusively with Marx’s mature economic analysis. The present 
discussion seeks to fill this gap in the literature.
10
  
 
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. The next section deals 
with Marx’s acquisition of the conceptual apparatus he needed for his 
critique of Hegel’s political philosophy. Then follows a discussion of 
some of Hegel’s political philosophical ideas. This discussion was found 
to be necessary because the development of Marx’s own standpoint takes 
place through his detailed critique of Hegel’s political philosophical 
thought. The next section discusses the evolution of Marx’s philosophical 
standpoint before his encounter with political economy. This is followed 
by an outline of those aspects of Adam Smith’s economic thought which 
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8
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 See for instance, Schumpeter (1954), Roll (1992), Roncaglia (2005). Roll and Roncaglia both make 
references to the Manuscripts; Roll (1992, footnote, p..228), and  Roncaglia (2005, p. 250) in his 
reference links the ‘Marxian analysis of alienation’ to the ‘alienation passage’ in the  Wealth of  
Nations. See footnote 10 below 
10
 To be sure, there is a large volume of literature on the relationship between Smith and Marx. One 
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Enlightenment more generally, on Marx. See, for instance, Hill (2004), Meek (1967 and 1980). 
Another part of the literature revolves around whether Smith’s idea (in the ‘alienation passage’) 
regarding the degrading effect of division of labour in the plant on the worker (Smith 1976, vol. 2, bk. 
V: 781-82) was a ‘predecessor’ of Marx’s concept of alienation  See, for instance, Rosenberg (1965), 
West (1964, 1969), Lamb (1973) and  Drosos (1996). The present paper discusses the Smith-Marx 
relationship from a completely different perspective. In fact, no reference is made to the ‘alienation 
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synthesis between his own philosophical standpoint and classical political economy that Marx begins to 
develop in the Manuscripts. The implication of the present paper is that this debate focusing largely on 
the ‘alienation passage’ has missed the point of the Smith-Marx relationship. .  
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Marx found particularly relevant to the development of his own thought. 
The next section will show how Marx attempted to synthesise the 
philosophical thought he had arrived at with Smith’s political economy.    
As already indicated, this discussion will explain the apparent paradox of 
the celebrated prophet of liberal-capitalism having cocked the gun for the 
equally celebrated prophet of communism. The paper ends with a brief 
concluding section.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
  
2. A New Conceptual Framework    
 
Marx wrote his first systematic critique of Hegel’s political philosophy in 
the spring and summer of 1843, when he was 25-year old. From his 
correspondence with the editor of a radical journal, Arnold Ruge, we see 
that he had started to work on a critique of Hegel’s political philosophy at 
least from the beginning of 1842. In a letter to Ruge of 10 February he 
says he has ‘come to the end of voluminous works’. (Marx-Engels 1975, 
1: 382) We may assume that he was referring to his proposed critique of 
Hegel’s political philosophy. Less than a month later (5 March) he writes 
to Ruge that he was writing a critique of the Hegelian philosophy ‘insofar 
it concerns the ‘internal political system’ (Ibid.) Two weeks later (20 
March) he apologises for not having been able to complete the article. 
(Marx-Engels 1975, 1: 385) Around this time Marx started to write for 
(and later edit) the liberal Cologne newspaper Rheinische Zeitung and it 
is likely that he had to suspend his work on the Hegel critique as his 
journalism would have left him with little time to pursue his plan further.  
 
However, there were possibly other, deeper reasons for lack of progress. 
It has been plausibly suggested that the lack of progress was the result of 
Marx not having the appropriate conceptual framework to deal with the 
subject adequately, and that this difficulty was resolved  with the 
publication, in February 1843, of Ludwig Feuerbach’s Preliminary 
Theses for the Reform of Philosophy.
11
 The Theses made a powerful 
impact on Marx. He wrote to Ruge (13 March) that ‘Feuerbach’s 
aphorisms seem to be incorrect only in one respect; he refers too much to 
nature and too little to politics. But it is politics which happens to be the 
only link through which contemporary philosophy can become true.’ 
(Marx-Engels 1975, 1: 400)   
 
The new framework consisted of Feuerbach’s reversal of Hegel. Hegel 
had attempted to solve the traditional philosophical problem of dualism 
between mind and matter, thought and reality, by postulating that reality 
                                                 
11
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was merely a manifestation of spirit (God, Idea, consciousness, man’s 
thought process)
12
. Spirit, in its development, creates and shapes reality, 
the world. In the beginning of this process, the world appears to Spirit as 
objective, external. This is an illusion because reality (in Hegel’s idealist 
philosophy) is merely a reflection of spirit. This is alienation. Over time, 
in the course of its self-development, spirit realises that the apparently 
objective objects, the world, are no more than projections of spirit itself. 
Thus, the world is divested of its illusionary objectivity. This process of 
understanding, of knowing, that the external world is nothing more than 
externalised spirit or consciousness is the process of the overcoming of 
alienation.
13
  
 
Feuerbach argued that Hegel’s idealist philosophy was an inverted 
representation of human reality. Philosophy, he observed, should 
recognise the primacy of the senses. It should start with the real man and 
not, as Hegel had done, with consciousness or spirit. He wrote in the 
Theses: ‘The real relationship of thought to being is this: Being is the 
subject [the determining factor], thought is predicate [the determined, 
attribute]. Thought proceeds from being, not being from thought.’14  The 
idea here is that man is not the expression or attribute (‘predicate’) of the 
divine thought-process. On the contrary, God is an expression of the 
thought-process of man. Hegel, by representing God in a state of 
alienation and then ‘returning to himself’ (that is, overcoming alienation) 
had mystified truth. God or spirit is nothing but man in his state of 
alienation. Feuerbach wrote: ‘Man – this is the mystery of religion – 
projects his being into objectivity, and then makes himself an object 
[creation] of this projected image of himself… Thus in God man has only 
his own activity, an object. God is, per se, his relinquished self.’15 Thus 
the attributes assigned to God by man were human attributes which seem 
to be lacking in the present state of man. Man will overcome his 
alienation (in the sphere of religion) when he has discovered this truth.  
 
This is the standpoint, arrived at through an inversion of Hegel’s idealist 
philosophy, that provided the breakthrough – conceptual apparatus – that 
Marx needed to develop his critique of Hegel’s political philosophy. This 
model of religious alienation will now, in the period under consideration, 
will become central to Marx’s thought; he will first extend it to the 
political, and then to the economic, sphere. The phenomenon of 
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 We note that in the passage quoted in the preceding section, Marx refers to Hegel’s metaphysical 
entity as ‘the so-called general development of the human mind’. In the ‘Postface’ to the second edition 
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13
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14
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alienation is a relationship of power. The powers that the religious man 
has bestowed on God are his own powers, and the process of overcoming 
alienation is man retrieving these powers for himself. These are the 
powers that the ‘species-man’ (the term that Marx takes from Feuerbach) 
shares with others. These powers constitute man’s ‘universal essence’; 
these are man’s potentialities that he is unable to realise because he is not 
aware of his true situation.  
 
Soon after he found this breakthrough, Marx departed from Feuerbach’s 
thought in two significant respects. We have already noted that Marx’s 
first reaction to Feuerbach’s Theses contained the observation that he 
gave too much attention to nature and not enough to politics. Marx gave 
much more importance to social factors, setting man in his social setting, 
than Feuerbach had done.
16
  Second, as we have seen, in Feuerbach man 
overcomes his religious alienation entirely through a revolution in 
consciousness, the realisation that he had alienated his powers to 
something that was his own creation. Marx will soon come to the 
conclusion that man’s alienation resulted from his life-situation, and thus 
to overcome alienation man had to change this situation.  
 
3. Hegel’s Problem and its Solution  
 
The formation of Marx’s political-philosophical standpoint before he 
came to the study of political economy can be traced in the three papers 
he wrote between the summer of 1843 and February 1844.
17
 The 
‘Contribution to a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law’ (to be referred 
to as the Critique) was written during the summer of 1843.  The second, 
‘The Jewish Question’, was written soon after the Critique was 
completed, and the third, ‘Introduction’ to the Critique, was written after 
Marx moved to Paris towards the end of October 1843. The latter two 
appeared in the journal Deutsch-Franzoesische Jahrbuecher which he 
and Ruge published towards the end of February (1844) in Paris. The 
much longer – 130 pages – and philosophically more important Critique 
was not published until 1927. It is this article that Marx wrote in order to 
find a solution to ‘the doubts that assailed’ him at the time. The issues 
raised in the Critique are carried over into the other two articles.  
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 On the relationship between Feuerbach and Marx, see  Hook (1966: chapter  VIII). Hook writes 
(p.272): ‘What fundamentally separates Marx from Feuerbach is his historical approach and his 
concrete analysis of those factors of social life which appear to Feuerbach as abstractions.’  
17
 In the summer of 1844 Marx also wrote a polemical article for a German language newspaper 
published in Paris (Marx-Engels 1975, 3: 189-206)  In this article, entitled ‘Critical Marginal Notes on 
the Article ‘The King of Prussia and Social Reform: By a Prussian’”, Marx largely drew on the ideas 
already expressed in the three articles mentioned in the text.  
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Marx’s general position with respect to Hegel’s political philosophical 
thought is that it contains truth but in ‘mystified’ form. Hegel, according 
to him, very often presents, within the speculative description, a real 
description, one that grasps the matter itself. In the Critique, Marx 
accepts Hegel’s notions of the state and civil society, and he shares the 
problem Hegel is trying to resolve in his political philosophy. In fact, he 
makes these notions and the problem very much his own. The main thrust 
of Marx’s critique is that Hegel fails to solve the problem he has set for 
his theory. To follow Marx’s line of thinking it is therefore important that 
we see what the problem is and how Hegel attempts to resolve it.                               
.  
Hegel recognised that with the dissolution of feudalism a change of great 
significance had taken place in Europe. Under feudalism political life was 
interwoven with economic life.
18
 With the end of feudalism and the 
development of capitalism, the economy had evolved into a sphere of life 
separated from the state; it had achieved a high degree of autonomy. In 
other words, the modern society had come to be characterised by a 
dualism between what Hegel calls ‘civil society’19 (broadly, the private 
sphere, more narrowly, the economy) and the public sphere, the state. 
Civil society functions on the principle of individualism. Individuals 
pursue their private ends without regard to the interests of other members 
of society. And since under conditions of social division of labour and 
exchange, individuals must engage with each other they are led to use 
others as means to their private ends. Civil society thus becomes the  
playground of competing interests which if allowed free play make for 
‘ethical corruption’. (Hegel 2008: 182) It is true that the pursuit of 
individual interest, has in varying degrees, characterised all historical 
societies, the difference between them and the modern society is that in 
the latter the principle of individualism has been legitimised and has 
received its full play.   
 
The other aspect of social life, as mentioned, is the state. In this aspect of 
their lives people are united in a common bond, a bond of solidarity 
which makes them an organic whole, a nation.
20
 In Hegel’s conception, 
the state is the product of history, it has evolved over time as only an 
organism can; individuals are related to each other as parts of an 
                                                 
18
 Marx discusses the difference between feudal society and modern capitalism: the former was 
characterised by the union of political life and economic life while in capitalism there was a split 
between the two, that is, capitalism was characterised by dualism. But the organic nature of feudal 
society did not mean absence of man’s alienation; only that it took a different form. See (Marx-Engels 
1975, 3: 32, 165-66).  
19
 For Hegel’s definition of civil society, see Hegel (2008: 162)  
20
 It should be noted that Hegel’s theory is a theory of the modern nation state, what he calls the 
‘developed state of our epoch’. (Hegel 2008: 234)  
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organism. ‘They are held together by the single life they all share. The 
parts depend on the whole for their life, but on the other hand, the 
persistence of life necessitates the differentiation of the parts.’21 This 
notion of the state may be contrasted with that which regards the state (or 
society) as a voluntary association, the result of a social contract among 
individuals, who have come together for certain specific purposes. In this 
notion society exists merely to serve the interest of the individual.  
 
Dualism thus refers to the split between the state and economy; in Marx’s 
words it ‘is the conflict between the general interest and the private 
interest, the schism between the political state and civil society.’ (Marx-
Engels 1975, 3:155) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
Hegel’s idea of the state (Marx’s too) requires resolution of this problem.  
Hegel’s theory has to recreate, at a higher level of development, the unity 
that characterised society before the economy became sharply 
differentiated from the political sphere; it has to resolve the conflict 
between the state and civil society such that individuals live by universal 
criteria, and the individualism that is the foundation of civil society is 
reined in.    
 
To better understand Hegel’s theory (and Marx’s critique of it) it will be 
helpful to recall that the autonomy of the economy from the state – the 
dualism - that presents Hegel (and also Marx) such a problem was 
something that was celebrated by the political economists of the 
eighteenth century, the time when the broad outlines of the capitalist 
economy had clearly emerged in parts of Europe. It became the task of 
classical political economy to conceptualise the new economy and 
theoretically demonstrate that it had a logic of its own, that it could 
function on its own (indeed, would work better when left alone), and that 
there was no tension between the pursuit of individual self-interest and 
the general interest of society. In fact, political economy attempted to 
demonstrate that the universal interest was best served when, in a 
framework of competitive markets, individuals were left free to pursue 
their self-interested impulses independently of the interests of others. 
Admittedly, the state had a social function, but this role was confined to 
ensuring a framework of law and order in which individual freedom and 
private property were protected, and to performing those socially 
‘necessary’ services that markets were unable to provide. According to 
this view the state existed to serve civil society, that is, the individual.   
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 Editor’s note (Hegel 2008:336).  
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Hegel, writing in 1821 and dealing with the problem of the autonomy of 
the economy from the state, could hardly avoid reference to the claims of 
classical political economy. He did make reference to it, in his dense and 
obscure jargon but without confronting its central theoretical 
propositions.
22
 However, implying criticism of political economy’s 
claims regarding the smooth functioning of the capitalist economy, he 
drew attention to its inherent instability, its tendency towards 
overproduction, creation of unemployment and inequality. And 
foreshadowing Marx’s troublesome ‘increasing impoverishment’ thesis, 
he wrote: ‘In the same process [economic expansion], however, 
dependence and want increase ad infinitum, and the material to meet 
these [needs] is permanently barred to the needy’. (Hegel 2008: 190)  In 
one of his earlier writings, he had referred to the ’alienation passage’ 
from the Wealth of Nations and declared that in modern industrial 
production ‘the consciousness of the factory worker is degraded to the 
utmost level of dullness.
23
  
 
Despite his recognition of the ills of contemporary capitalism, Hegel is 
unable to offer any solution to the problems he identifies. His state is 
strictly non-interventionist. For instance, he explicitly rules out any 
measures aimed at redistributing income. (Hegel 2008: 192)  Civil society 
remains a distinct and autonomous sphere of life. The structure of civil 
society that Hegel suggests (considered presently) may provide some 
measure of amelioration of the problem mentioned, but he makes no 
claims in this regard
24
. Hegel rejects classical political economy on 
philosophical grounds. Despite recognising its scientific endeavours, he 
claims that ‘this is a field in which [superficial] understanding with its 
subjective aims and moral opinions vents its discontent and moral 
frustration.’ (Hegel 2008: 187.)   
 
How is then the problem of dualism to be resolved? This brings us to 
Hegel’s model of the institutional and political structure of the state. This 
structure consists of hereditary, constitutional monarchy which is the 
embodiment of the nation’s sovereignty, the executive or the 
bureaucracy, appointed by the monarch, and a two-chamber legislature. 
The upper house of the legislature is based on hereditary peerage (the 
class of landowners) and the lower chamber is indirectly elected by civil 
society. It is only the latter that interests here because it is through this 
                                                 
22
 He mentions the names of Adam Smith, J. B. Say and David Ricardo, and refers to political economy 
as a science ‘which has arisen out of the conditions of the modern world’ and  which is ‘a credit to 
thought because it finds laws for a mass of contingencies’ .(Hegel 2008: 187.)  
23
 Quoted in Avineri (1994: 93).  
24
 Such a claim is made on his behalf by the Editor (Hegel 2008: xxx). 
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aspect of the political structure that the claimed solution to the problem of 
dualism, and the participation of civil society in the affairs of the state, is 
achieved.
25
  
 
It is a fundamental premise of Hegel’s theoretical system that individual 
qua individual cannot be directly incorporated into the universality of the 
state. An individual acquires his or her personality only as member of a 
group or a class. For instance, he writes: ‘When we say that a human 
being is ‘somebody’, we mean that he should belong to a specific estate, 
since to be a somebody means to have substantial being. A person with 
no estate is a mere private person and does not enjoy actual universality.’ 
(Hegel 2008: 197) It is worth noting here that the landowning class is 
considered as already organically integrated, they are already an estate, 
while individuals in civil society (characterised by ‘moveable’ property) 
are atomistically dispersed, lacking any ‘political cohesion’. So the 
problem relates to the latter.  
 
What this means is that there must be institutions that ‘mediate’ between 
the individual (in civil society) and the state. The mediating institution in 
the sphere of industry and trade is the ‘corporation’ (which includes both 
employers and workers), each trade or industry having its own such 
association. The corporation is a kind of ‘second family for its members’. 
It has a distinctly educational function. (Hegel 2008: 226) Members of a 
corporation have common interests which are distinguished from those 
operating in other trades. The corporation will naturally look after these 
common interests. Members of a corporation will have conflict of interest 
with each other – for instance, they compete in the same market, and 
there will be clash of interest between employers and their workers. 
Hegel does not go into such mundane detail, but we may assume that the 
idea must be that it will be the task of the corporation to manage internal 
competition, say, with respect to prices and output levels, and guide 
relations between employers and employees through some kind of works 
councils. The central idea here is that through the corporation, individuals 
learn to give greater priority to their common interests (learn to abide by 
‘universal criteria’) over their individual interests and thus develop a 
greater sense of social solidarity. The corporation may thus be regarded 
as the first stage in the incorporation of the individual in the state 
organism and rein in his individualistic impulses. Deputies from various 
corporations come together in an estate. This is the second stage of 
                                                 
25
  It is important to note that Hegel’s model is not in any sense prescriptive. There is no room in 
Hegel’s philosophy for what he contemptuously calls ‘ought-to-be’.  (Hegel 2008: 234). According to 
Hegel, philosophy is its ‘time apprehended in thought’; it cannot jump ahead of its time. (Editor’s 
comment in Hegel 2008: xxviii) 
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mediation. And finally delegates from this estate, together with the estate 
representing the landed class constitute the legislature. The legislature has 
very little power which lies with the bureaucracy and ultimately with the 
monarch; it seems to do little more than give voice to the prevailing 
opinion in civil society.  
 
This is how Hegel’s model (when it is brought down to earth from its 
metaphysical heights) achieves the union of the private interest and the 
general interest, the solution to the problem of dualism. Civil society 
retains its autonomy. Through the device of the corporation and the estate 
he attempts to give it organic character and free it of its individualism. It, 
in fact, looks like the model of a corporatist capitalist economy overseen 
by a highly centralised state.                                                                                                                                                                                                            
 
4. Formation of Marx’s philosophical standpoint  
 
It was noted earlier that Marx accepts, without its metaphysical trappings, 
Hegel’s idea of the state as the union of the universal and the particular. 
In the Critique he refers to this notion as the ‘genuine’ or ‘rational’ state. 
In the writings that follow the Critique, he expresses the same idea as 
‘human emancipation’, ’democracy’, ‘true democracy’, and finally settles 
on ‘socialism’ or ‘communism’26. The central idea refers to the 
individual-society relationship. It implies rejection of the principle of 
individualism, an idea based on the view that there are some aspects of 
the individual’s life that are independent of society. Against this, Marx 
adopts the view that the individual cannot be conceptualised as standing 
outside society. Nearly fifteen years later, in the Grundrisse, he expresses 
this idea as follows: ‘Society does not consist of individuals; it expresses 
the sum of connections and relationships in which individuals find 
themselves.’  (McLellen 1973a: 89)  This idea will remain fundamental to 
his mature thought.
27
  
 
Dualism is negation of this idea. It epitomises the split between the 
individual and society. It is the ‘decomposition’ of man into a member of 
civil society and member of the state; it is the ‘conflict between the 
general interest and private interest’. (Marx-Engels 1975, 3: 155) Marx 
                                                 
26
 At this time there is ambiguity in Marx’s use of the word ‘communism’. See (Marx-Engels 1975, 3: 
603, note. 85).  
27
 In the Manuscripts, Marx writes: ‘Above all we must avoid postulating ‘society’ again as an 
abstraction vis-a -vis the individual. The individual is the social being.  His manifestations of life – 
even if they may not appear in the direct form of communal manifestations of life carried out in 
association with others – are therefore an expression and confirmation of social life. Man’s individual 
and species-life are not different, however much – and this is inevitable – the mode of existence of the 
individual is a more particular or more general mode of life of the species, or the life of the species is 
more particular or more general individual life.’ (Marx-Engels 1975, 3: 299) 
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states the problem clearly: ‘Where the political state has attained its true 
development, man – not only in thought, in consciousness, but in reality, 
in life – leads a two-fold life, a heavenly and an earthly life: life in the 
political community, in which he considers himself a communal being, 
and life in civil society, in which he acts as a private individual, regards 
other men as a means, degrades himself into a means, and becomes the 
plaything of alien powers.’ (Marx-Engels 1975, 3, p. 154.) ‘Human 
emancipation’ is the overcoming of the antithesis between the actual, 
political state and civil society. When that is achieved ‘civil society is 
actual political society.’ (Marx-Engels 1975, 3, p. 119) In the writings 
being discussed here Marx makes no attempt to directly and 
systematically develop his own vision of the ‘genuine’ state; the vision is 
developing through criticism of others, but we may read here (where 
there is no dividing line between civil society and the state) the later 
Marxian concept of the ‘abolition’ or the ‘disappearance’ of the state.  
 
It is on the basis of this standpoint that Marx rejects liberal political 
philosophy. This he does in the article ‘The Jewish Question’. This was a 
review of two articles (with the same title) written by his old friend Bruno 
Bauer on the subject of ‘Jewish emancipation’ in Germany. Bauer had 
argued for a liberal, secular state, claiming that once Christianity, and 
religion in general, had lost its privileged position, the ‘Jewish question’ 
would naturally disappear. Marx uses the review to continue his 
discussion of the issues raised in the just-completed Critique.  
 
‘Political emancipation’ that is, the secular, liberal state, Marx writes, 
would certainly be an advance in the politically backward Prussia, but 
this progress will be within the limits of the existing social order. This 
will not be ‘human emancipation’ (a term that now replaces the ‘rational 
state’ of the Critique). Take, for instance, the rights of man enshrined in 
the constitutions of revolutionary France (1791, 1793) and North 
America. Liberty, writes Marx  
 
is the  right to do everything that harms no one else. The limits within 
which anyone can act without harming someone else are defined by law, 
just as the boundary between two fields is determined by a boundary 
post. It is a question of the liberty of man as an isolated monad, 
withdrawn into himself…The right of man to liberty is based not on the 
association of man with man, but on the separation of man from man. 
(Marx-Engels 1975, 3: 163)   
 
He adds that it is this liberty that forms the basis of civil society. It 
‘makes every man see in other men not the realisation of his freedom, but 
the barrier to it.’ (Marx-Engels 1975, 3: 163) From here Marx comes to 
 13 
the conclusion that private property (‘the power of money’) is the root 
cause of social ills. The right to enjoy one’s property independently of 
society is the right of this self-interest.  
 
On the question of religion being made the private affair of the 
individual, Marx takes the view that what the secular state does is to 
‘emancipate’ itself from religion without making man free of religion. 
The existence of religion, according to Marx, even when practised by the 
exercise of ‘free’ choice is a defect in society. This is the choice of an 
‘un-free’, alienated man: this man can experience himself only through an 
intermediary, by surrendering himself to something that is his own 
creation.  
 
It is on the basis of this reasoning that Marx rejects Hegel’s solution to 
the problem of dualism. Marx extends the concept of religious alienation 
to the political sphere. He writes: ‘Just as Christ is the intermediary to 
whom man transfers the burden of his divinity, all his burden of divinity, 
all his religious constraint [bond], so the state is the intermediary to 
whom man transfers all his non-divinity and all his human unconstraint 
[freedom].’ (Ibid. p.152) Hegel’s model is a model of political alienation. 
In it civil society remains distinct and separate from the state; it remains 
the domain of individualism, and the medieval device of the estate fails to 
achieve any degree of meaningful participation of the people in the affairs 
of the state. All political power lies with the monarch and his 
bureaucracy.  
 
The capital achievement of the Critique is Marx’s de-mystification of 
Hegel’s model of the state. Hegel, according to Marx, deduces real world 
phenomena from concepts, by making reality a reflection of 
consciousness. As an example of this he quotes Hegel: ‘The final decision 
of the will is the Monarch.’ One should instead say (says Marx): ‘In the 
historical context of the early 19
th
 century, the will of the Monarch finally 
decides.’  
 
If Hegel (Marx writes) had set out from the real subjects as the bases of the state he 
would not have found it necessary to transform the state in a mystical fashion into a 
subject. ‘In its truth’, says Hegel, ‘subjectivity exists only as a subject, personality only as 
a person’. This too is a piece of mystification.  Subjectivity is a characteristic [predicate] 
of the subject, personality a characteristic of the person [subject]. Instead of conceiving 
them as predicates of the subjects [determinants], Hegel gives the predicates an 
independent existence and subsequently transforms them in a mystical fashion into their 
subjects. (Marx-Engels 1975,  3:.23)  
  
 
When Hegel’s model is de-mystified, when Hegel, who is standing on his 
head, is stood the right side up, we find the true relationship, as it exists in 
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reality, between civil society and the state. It is not civil society that is a 
reflection of the state, it is the existing political structure that reflects the 
interest-oriented character of civil society. By thus inverting Hegel, Marx 
arrives at the revolutionary result that the existing political institutions are 
a reflection of the material conditions of life. Writing many years later, 
Engels expressed this discovery of Marx which, after further 
development, will be referred to as ‘the materialist conception of history’, 
as follows: ‘Proceeding from the Hegelian philosophy of law [right], 
Marx came to the conclusion that it was not the state which Hegel had 
described as the ‘top of the edifice’ but ‘civil society’ which Hegel had 
regarded with disdain that was the sphere in which a key to the 
understanding of the process of historical development of mankind 
should be looked for.’ 28  
` 
It is only step from here to say that if you wish to achieve ‘human 
emancipation’ you need to change the material conditions of life as they 
prevail in civil society.  
 
We noted earlier that Marx had, in some important respects, gone beyond 
Feuerbach; that in Feuerbach’s model, the overcoming of religious 
alienation requires no more than a revolution in consciousness. Once man 
has become aware that God is only a creation of his own imagination, he 
overcomes his alienation. It is different in the political sphere. To 
overcome political alienation more than a simple cognitive act is needed; 
in addition to the realisation that the political system is simply the 
externalisation of man in the form of political power, political action is 
required to retrieve the power that belongs to man. Marx is thus led by 
the logic of his argument to think about the relationship between theory 
and practice (another important theme in Marxist theory). He writes in the 
‘Introduction’ to the Critique:   
 
The weapon of criticism  cannot, of course, replace criticism by weapons, material force 
must be overthrown by material force; but theory also becomes a material force as soon 
as it has gripped the masses. . .  To be radical is to grasp things by the root.  But for man 
the root is man himself. The evident proof of the radicalism of Germany theory,  and 
hence of its practical energy, is that it proceeds from a resolute positive abolition of 
religion.  The criticism of religion ends with the teaching that man is the highest being for 
man, hence with the categorical imperative to overthrow all relations in which man is a 
debased, enslaved, forsaken, despicable being, relations which cannot be better 
described than by the exclamation of a Frenchman when it was planned to introduce a 
tax on dogs: Poor dogs! They want to treat you like human beings! (Marx-Engels 1975,  
3: 182)   
  
From here Marx is led to the agency that would carry out ‘the categorical 
imperative to overthrow all relations that debase man’. Marx approaches 
                                                 
28
 Marx-Engels (1958: vol. 2: 157).  
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this question in the context of the contemporary German situation. 
Germany could not repeat the experience of revolutionary France. The 
configuration of social forces in Germany was very different from that in 
the France of 1780s. In France there was clearly a class of ‘negative, 
general significance’ consisting of the nobility and the clergy. At the 
same time there was a class that could identify its interests with those of 
the people and could therefore claim leadership of society. This was the 
bourgeoisie. France thus had a class of oppression confronting a class of 
emancipation.  
 
In Germany the situation was characterised by political fragmentation. 
Here when a class ‘begins the struggle against the class above it, it is 
involved in the struggle against the class below it’. In particular, when the 
bourgeoisie struggles against the monarchy and the bureaucracy it is, at 
the same time, threatened by the proletariat. ‘No sooner the middle class 
dare to think of emancipation from its own standpoint than the 
development of social conditions and the progress of social theory 
pronounce this development antiquated or at least problematic.’ (Marx-
Engels (1975, 3: 185-86).    
 
Who will then lead the struggle for ‘human emancipation’? By an                                                                                                                          
interesting twist of logic, Marx now argues that while in the industrially 
advanced countries partial emancipation can lead eventually to universal, 
human emancipation, in Germany - which is unable to arrive at human 
emancipation through the transitional stage of a bourgeoisie-led political 
revolution - universal emancipation  becomes ‘the  conditio sine qua non 
of any partial emancipation.’  German emancipation lies in 
 
the formation of a class with radical chains, a class of civil society which is not a class of 
civil society, an estate which is the dissolution of all estates, a sphere which has a 
universal character by its universal suffering and claims no particular right because no 
particular wrong but wrong generally is perpetrated against it; which can no longer 
invoke a historical  but only a human title; which does not stand in any one-sided 
antithesis to the consequences but in an all-round antithesis to the premises  of the 
German state; a sphere, finally, which cannot emancipate itself  without emancipating 
itself from all other spheres of society, and thereby emancipating all other spheres of 
society which, in a word, is the complete loss of man and  hence can win itself only 
through the complete rewinning of man. This dissolution of society as a particular estate 
is the proletariat. (Marx-Engels 1975, 3: 186) .  
 
It is noteworthy that Marx arrives at this momentous conclusion entirely 
un-empirically. Proletariat carries within itself the same ‘universal’ 
quality as was to be found in Hegel’s notion of the bureaucracy as ‘the 
universal class’ which had no interest other than the universal interest in 
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view.
29
 The proletariat - the perfect expression of the alienated man - 
receives its universal character through sheer necessity and from its 
universal suffering.  
 
It is at this point in the development of his philosophical thought that 
Marx turns to the study of political economy. Until now, as we have seen, 
he has been exclusively ploughing the philosophical field.  
 
5, Two Facets of Adam Smith’s Political Economy 
   
When Marx first read the Wealth of Nations in 1844 he noted that Smith’s 
‘political economy had merely formulated the laws of alienated labour’. 30 
(Marx-Engels 1975, 3: 291) The aspect of Smith’s political economy to 
which Marx is referring here would later become the source of Marx’s 
own economic thought. As noted, in the Manuscripts he makes the first 
attempt to synthesise his philosophical thought with classical political 
economy. Distinct from this there is another facet of Smith’s thought. 
This endorses the principle of individualism and liberal economic 
philosophy. This aspect of political economy Marx rejected. In fact, its 
rejection was already implicit in the philosophical thought he had 
developed before his encounter with Smith. To better understand Marx’s 
attempted synthesis of his philosophical thought with political economy, 
it is necessary to briefly outline these two facets of Smith’s economic 
thought. We start with its second aspect.   
 
According to Smith, man has certain natural inclinations which govern 
his behaviour. The principal among them is the desire to improve one’s 
condition. At the same time men wish to reap where they have not sown. 
This means that there must be institutions that direct their desires into 
socially beneficial channels. In the commercial society (given the 
framework of laws that protect private property, etc.) competition 
provides such an institution. Monopoly – the antithesis of competition – 
results from policies of governments that confer privileges on individuals 
or sections of society, and from restrictions that are relics of the feudal 
times. Given the frame of competition, the individual, who is assumed to 
know where his best interest lies, should be left free to pursue it in his 
own way. This is Smith’s principle of ‘natural liberty’. Smith claims that 
when this principle prevails, the individual while pursuing his own self-
                                                 
29
 The industrial working  class in Germany at this time probably made up no more that five percent of 
the total working population.  
30
 If one can think in terms of any eureka moments in Marx’s entire intellectual development, I would 
suggest that this encounter with Smith was one, and the discovery of the method of inverting Hegel 
through Feuerbach was the other.  
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interest also, at the same time, promotes the ‘general interest’ of society. 
The principle of natural liberty, in Hegel’s language, promotes the union 
the universal and the particular, of the private interest and general 
interest.  It is important to note here that the individual promotes the 
‘general interest’, unconsciously, without any intention of doing so. (In 
fact, good intentions were to be avoided. Smith had never known much 
good done by those who affected to trade for the public good.) This in 
essence was the case for the limited role of the state in the functioning of 
the economy, for celebrating dualism that would be such a problem for 
Hegel and Marx.    
 
Smith’s claim raises two important questions: what is ‘the general interest 
of society’? and, what is the mechanism through which the pursuit of 
individual self-interest results in the promotion of the general interest? 
Smith’s reasoning goes something like this. In conditions of free 
competition capitalists, driven by their interest, will invest in those 
branches of production where they expect to earn maximum profits. 
Similarly, workers will seek employment where they expect to receive 
the highest wages.  When every individual is using his or her resources to 
his best advantage, society’s resources are also being used most 
effectively. As a result the national product is the highest under the given 
technological conditions. Furthermore, under these conditions high 
profits will result in high investment and this investment will, under the 
spur of competition, be used to introduce new and more efficient methods 
of production. The result will be increasing wealth of the nation. 
Increasing national wealth means general prosperity and this Smith 
pragmatically equates with the ‘general interest’ of society. ‘The 
progressive state [of the economy] is in reality the cheerful state to all 
orders of society’ (Smith 1976: vol. I: 99]  The principle of natural liberty 
in the shape of free, competitive markets in the capitalist economy 
provides the mechanism through which the pursuit of particular interest  
leads to universal interest, that it benefits all sections of society. As 
indicated, this conclusion is not derived from the other aspect of Smith’s   
political economy. To this aspect we now turn.  .                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
 
Here we start with the definition of the subject matter of political 
economy: the study of the production of wealth of a nation. Wealth 
consists of all the goods produced in a year minus the necessary costs of 
producing these goods. These costs consist of goods that make up the 
necessary consumption of labour, materials, etc., and the wear and tear of 
fixed capital. These goods constitute capital that is used up in the 
production of wealth. The nation’s wealth thus consists of the surplus of 
commodities over and above the capital used up in the production of 
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these commodities. The capital thus recovered is used for the production 
of  wealth the  following year. And so year after year.  
 
The nation’s wealth is produced by labour. The very first sentence of the 
Wealth of Nations reads: ‘The annual labour of every nation is the fund 
which originally supplies it with all the necessaries and conveniences of 
life which it annually consumes, and which consist always, either in the 
immediate product of that labour, or in what is purchased with that 
produce from other nations.’ Marx did not read this sentence as a mere 
rhetorical flourish. Adam Smith ‘s political economy, Marx noted in the 
Manuscripts, had acknowledged labour as its principle. ‘To this 
enlightened political economy, which has discovered – within private 
property – the subjective essence of wealth, the adherents of the monetary 
and mercantile system, who look upon private property only as an 
objective substance confronting men, seem therefore to be fetishists, 
Catholics.
31
 Engels was therefore right to call Adam Smith the Luther of 
Political Economy. Just as Luther recognised religion – faith – as the 
substance of the of the external  world and in consequence stood opposed 
to Catholic paganism – just as he superseded external religiosity by 
making religiosity the inner substance of man – just as he negated the 
priests outside the layman because he transplanted the priest into 
layman’s heart, just so with wealth: wealth as something outside man and 
independent of him, and therefore as something to be maintained and 
asserted only in an external fashion is done away with; that is , this 
external, mindless objectivity of wealth is done  away with, with private 
property being incorporated in man himself and with him being 
recognised as its essence.’32 (Marx-Engels 1975, 3: 290-91)  
 
Built into Smith’s concept of wealth is the notion of economic 
reproduction, a process that takes place in historical time. As noted, this 
year’s cycle of production starts with the inputs (capital) inherited from 
the preceding year; these inputs that are used up are reproduced (with a 
surplus), and used in the following year.
33
 When part of the surplus is re-
                                                 
31
 ‘Subjective essence’ when translated into the language of  political economy means simply labour 
time expended in the production of goods making up wealth or ‘labour embodied’ in it; ‘objective’ 
means something that is a given datum (as Marx says) ‘confronting men’.  
32
 Engel’s reference to Adam Smith as ‘the economic Luther’ is made in his ‘Outlines of a Critique of 
Political Economy’ published in the Deutsch-Franzoesische Jahrbuecher.. (Marx-Engels 1975, 3: 422) 
This notion of labour figures prominently in Marx’s philosophical thought. For instance, he writes in 
the Manuscripts: ‘Hegel’s standpoint is that of modern political economy. He grasps labour as the 
essence of man… [but] the only labour which Hegel knows and recognises is abstractly mental labour.’ 
(Marx-Engels 1975, 3: 333)  We see in this idea the origin of Marx’s theory of value. Labour’s 
‘subjective essence’ is ‘objectified’ in its product.      
33
 It may be noted that Sraffa uses this feature of classical political economy (and his own schema) to 
distinguish it from the orthodox, neoclassical economic theory. In classical political economy, he 
writes, we have the ‘picture of the system of production and consumption as a circular process’ which 
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invested we have economic expansion. Marx could not have failed to see 
here the Hegelian notion of evolution. It is a situation of internally 
generated development or expanded self-reproduction without the 
involvement of any extraneous factor. Smith’s model, in which expanded 
reproduction takes place within the frame of capitalist relations, will 
allow Marx to insert dynamic elements that would take development 
beyond the bounds of this frame. (We will see in the next section that in 
the Manuscripts Marx takes the first step in this direction). We note that 
the circularity of the production process as outlined here necessarily gives 
the economy an organic character: only an organic entity can reproduce 
itself, and grow, without the involvement of an extraneous factor.  
 
Further, Adam Smith sees the production of wealth as a social activity. It 
takes the form of social division of labour. Different productive activities 
or industries complement each other and are thus ‘necessary to the 
existence of each other’. (Smith 1976, I: 360) In the very first chapter of 
the Wealth of Nations, he illustrates this phenomenon with reference to 
the manufacture of a day-labourer’s woollen coat. , ‘Observe the 
accommodation of the most common artificer or day-labourer in a 
civilized and thriving country and you will perceive that the number of 
people whose industry a part, though but a small part, has been employed 
in procuring him this accommodation, exceeds all computation.’ From 
the raising of the sheep, etc. to sorting, combing, spinning, weaving, 
transportation of the materials, the manufacture of tools and machinery 
for use in these activities, and so on and on – all these activities are 
involved in the production of this item which becomes ‘the produce of the 
joint labour of a great multitude of workmen.’ (Emphasis added)  (Smith 
1976, I: 22)  Individual labour has become social labour and the product 
satisfies a trans-subjective need. (Note that this is exactly how Marx 
would in his latter works define the term ‘commodity’.)   
 
The features of an economy outlined above are of a general nature; to 
various degrees they hold practically for all forms of human society. For 
example, all societies are characterised by social division of labour and of 
course they all reproduced themselves over time (if they do not they 
would cease to exist). And they all use ‘capital’ in the form of 
implements, etc., in their production. Such features of an economy may 
be considered of a technical nature. What distinguishes economies from 
each other is the form of social organisation (feudalism, capitalism, etc.) 
of which they are an aspect.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
‘stands in striking contrast to the view presented by modern theory, a one-way avenue that leads from 
‘factors of production’ [treated as given data] to consumption goods’. (Sraffa 1960: 93)    
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Adam Smith’s analysis of the conditions under which the wealth of a 
nation grows is set specifically in the social organisation he calls ‘the 
commercial society’, that is, modern capitalism. It is specially his 
conceptualisation of such an economy with the specific purpose of 
investigating the factors that lie behind economic development that 
determines the structure of classical political economy and gives it its 
scientific character. It is this analysis that makes an important 
contribution to the social theory that Marx will develop later. It is also 
here that we see Adam Smith departing from his individual-focused 
social philosophy. We will focus on one feature of such an economy; it is 
this aspect on which Marx draws to construct the synthesis referred to 
earlier.  
 
In Smith’s model of the capitalist economy society is divided into three 
social classes. These are defined in terms of the nature of the resources 
they own and their place in the production system. Landowners have no 
productive function and they derive their income – rent of land – from a 
resource (land) that is scarce, in the sense that (unlike capital goods) it is 
not reproducible. There are suggestions in his discussion of rent that there 
is conflict of interest between the landed class and the capitalist class – 
suggestions that Ricardo will later develop with the utmost rigour.  
 
The central relation in the production system is that between the capitalist 
class and labour. The capitalist class consists of those who have 
accumulated capital (in the form of purchasing power) and who will 
‘naturally employ it in setting to work industrious people, whom they will 
supply with materials and subsistence, in order to make a profit by the 
sale of their work. (Smith 1976, I: 65-66.) Workers as a class do not own 
capital and means of their subsistence and therefore they ‘stand in need of 
a master to advance them the materials of their work, and their 
subsistence and maintenance till it [the product] be compleated.’ (Smith 
1976, I: 83)  
 
The relationship between the two classes is one of power and antagonism.  
For the capitalist labour’s wages are a cost like any other item, say, feed 
for farm animals. Higher costs mean lower profits and the capitalist must 
therefore strive to have wages as low as possible. Workers, on the other 
hand, want their wages to be as high as possible. We have here two 
parties ‘whose interests are by no means the same. The workmen desire 
to get as much, the masters to give as little as possible. The former are 
disposed to combine in order to raise, the latter in order to lower the 
wages of labour.’ Smith adds: ‘It is not, however, difficult to foresee 
which of the two parties must, upon all ordinary occasions, have the 
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advantage in the dispute, and force the other into a compliance with their 
terms.’ (Smith 1976, I: 83-84) Smith then goes on to enumerate all the 
factors that work in favour of the masters. The only factor that works in 
favour of the workers is capital accumulation and economic expansion. 
Under these conditions when national prosperity is on the rise, and the 
demand for labour is buoyant, wages can rise above the level that is 
‘consistent with common humanity’. (Smith 1976, I: 86) However, 
although in this situation the conflict between capital and labour may be 
kept under check, the fundamental fact of the relationship of power and 
antagonism between the two classes remains unchanged. It is this 
relationship that provides the foundation for Marx’s synthesis of his 
philosophical standpoint with classical political economy.  
 
6. Generalisation of the concept of alienation   
 
We have noted that Marx turned to the study of political economy 
because he had come to the conclusion that the kind of society he 
considered to be the ideal one could only be achieved through a radical 
reorganisation of the existing civil society. This required understanding of 
the working of civil society. And this could only be realised through the 
study of political economy. It was also mentioned that the most important 
influence Marx received in his first encounter with political economy was 
Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, the first systematic presentation of 
classical political economy. From now on Marx will refer to his own 
work on political economy as a ‘critique’ of political economy. The 
‘critique’ in this case meant, first, adoption of the theoretical framework 
of classical political economy, and second, taking its concepts and 
economic relationships and developing them in a direction very different 
from its socio-philosophical aspect - endorsement of competitive 
capitalism. It is through this procedure that Marx’s developed critique of 
political economy creates a synthesis of his philosophical standpoint and 
classical political economy. The Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts of 1844 contain Marx’s first crucial steps in the development 
of this synthesis.   
 
The most important accomplishment of the Manuscripts is the 
generalisation of the concept of alienation. We also find here (as noted) 
Marx’s first, though limited, suggestion regarding the working of an 
evolutionary process within the classical framework that could take the 
economy beyond the bourgeois horizon to which Smith and his followers 
had restricted its development.  
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The first form of economic alienation Marx identifies is the alienation of 
the worker from his product. This form of alienation – ‘a fact of political 
economy’ (Marx-Engels 1975, 3: 278) - is derived fundamentally from 
the capital-labour relationship as found in Smith. Marx’s starting point is 
Smith’s statement (quoted in the preceding section) that all wealth, 
consisting of commodities, is produced by labour. Just as the religious 
man had ‘objectified’ or ‘externalised’ himself in the gods; just as the 
state was the ‘externalisation’ of man in the form of political power; in 
the same way labour ‘objectifies’ or ‘externalises’ itself in its product.  
Capital, since it consists of produced commodities, is also produced by 
labour. Capital (Marx quotes Smith) is ‘certain quantity of labour stocked 
and stored up to be employed’; and again, ‘The person who [either 
acquires, or] succeeds to a great fortune, does not necessarily [acquire, or] 
succeed to any political power […] The power which that possession 
immediately and directly conveys to him, is the power of purchasing; a 
certain command over the labour, over all the produce of labour, which is 
in the market.’ (Marx’s italics) (Marx-Engels 1975, 3: 247) Marx 
concludes: ‘Capital is thus the governing power over labour and its 
products.’ (ibid) 
 
In the very first paragraph of the ‘First Manuscript’ Marx paraphrases 
some of the observations from the chapter ‘Of the Wages of Labour’ in 
the Wealth of Nations,  highlighting the relationship of power between 
capital and labour and the capitalist’s ability to appropriate labour’s 
product. ‘His own labour as another man’s property and that the means of 
his existence and activity are increasingly concentrated in the hands of 
the capitalist.’   
 
All these consequences are implied in the statement that the worker is related to the 
product of his labour as to an alien object… The alienation of the worker in his product 
means not only that his labour becomes an object, an external  existence, but that it exists 
outside him, independently, as something alien to him, and that it becomes a power on its 
own confronting him.  It means that the life which he has conferred on the object 
confronts him as something hostile and alien.’ (Marx-Engels 1975, 3:  272)   
 
To repeat: through his social power, capital, itself the product of labour, 
is able to appropriate labour’s product. Labour’s own creation becomes a 
power over it. This is labour’s alienation from its product.  
 
The second form of alienation manifests itself in the act of production, ‘in 
the labour process’. (Marx-Engels 1975, 3: 275) The product from which 
the worker is alienated is but the result of his productive activity. ‘How 
could the worker (Marx asks) come to face the product of his activity as a 
stranger, were it not that in the very act of production he was estranging 
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himself from himself? The product is after all but the summary of the 
activity of production.’ (Marx-Engels 1975, 3: 274)  
 
Marx starts from the premise that productive activity is an aspect of 
man’s nature, his ‘essence’. Marx transfers to man the creativity that 
Hegel had attributed to God. Man is by nature a creative being; his need 
to engage in productive activity goes beyond the need merely to maintain 
his physical existence. It is through ‘conscious life activity’ that man 
asserts his humanity, his ‘species character’. Labour performed for the 
capitalist is labour solely aimed at physical existence; it is external to 
man’s intrinsic need. It is a case of self-estrangement.  
 
In creating a world of objects by his practical activity … man proves himself a conscious 
species-being … Admittedly animals also produce. They build nests, dwellings, like the 
bees, beavers, ants, etc. But an animal only produces one-sidedly while man produces 
universally. It produces only under the dominion of immediate physical need, while man 
produces even when he is free from physical need and only truly produces in freedom 
therefrom … Man therefore forms objects in accordance with the laws of beauty.  
(Marx-Engels 1975, 3:  276-77)  
 
[T]he external character of labour for the worker appears in the fact that it is not his 
own, but someone else’s; that it does not belong to him, that in it he belongs, not to 
himself, but to another. Just as in religion the spontaneous activity of the human 
imagination, of the human brain, human heart, operates on the individual independently 
of him – that is, operates as an alien, divine or diabolical activity – so is the worker’s 
activity not his spontaneous activity. It belongs to another; it is the loss of his self.’ 
(Marx-Engels 1975:  274-)   
 
When man is estranged from himself, he is necessarily estranged from 
other human beings. This follows from the standpoint that man’s ‘species 
character’ is essentially and fundamentally social. As we noted earlier 
(section 4), for Marx society is nothing but the sum of the relationships in 
which individuals find themselves. He writes here: ‘The estrangement of 
man, in fact every relationship in which man [stands] to himself, is 
realised and expressed only in the relationship in which man stands to 
other men.’ (Marx-Engels 1975, 3: 277; also p.278)  
 
We see here Marx moving towards what is perhaps the most momentous 
theoretical achievement in the development of his synthesis between his 
philosophical standpoint and the scientific discipline of classical political 
economy.  
 
Hence within the relationship of estranged labour each man views the other in 
accordance with the standard and the relationship in which man finds himself as a 
worker (emphasis added). (Marx-Engels 1975, 3: 278)  
 
Before his encounter with classical political economy (as we saw earlier) 
the proletariat’s role in ‘human emancipation’ was vaguely and un-
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empirically attributed to its ‘universal suffering’ and ‘sheer necessity’. 
Now he speaks of the relationship of the worker to other workers and 
workers’ relationship with capital in the context of production. This is the 
critical point of transition: before he spoke vaguely (as in ‘The Jewish 
Question) of the ‘power of money’, now he identifies the wage-system34 
with the system of private property; the abolition of one, he says, implies 
the abolition of the other. It is only when the wage-system is abolished 
that universal emancipation will be achieved. He writes:  
 
‘From the relationship of estranged labour to private property it follows further that the 
emancipation of society from private property, etc., from servitude, is expressed in the 
political form of the emancipation of the workers; not that their emancipation alone is at 
stake, but because the emancipation of the workers contains universal human 
emancipation – and it contains this, [ now emphasis added) because the whole of human 
servitude is involved in the relation of the worker to production, and all relations of 
servitude are but modifications and consequences of this relation.  (Marx-Engels 1975, 3: 
280).   
 
The source of all forms of alienation and man’s powerlessness are to be 
found in the relations that arise in the process of production. This, as 
indicated is the crucial step towards the next stage of the development of 
Marx’s thought: the Theses on Feuerbach (1845) and the ‘materialist 
conception’ that will be presented in the German Ideology (1845-46).  
 
Thanks to his study of political economy, Marx now sees the alienated 
man under capitalism as a commodity, bought and sold in the market, and 
which (as noted) for the capitalist is merely an item of cost of production. 
Adam Smith, while discussing the level below which capitalists (‘who 
generally have the advantage’) could not reduce the ‘ordinary wages even 
of the lowest species of labour, had referred to a ‘computation’ of 
Richard Cantillon’s. According to this computation the minimum 
subsistence wage was that that was necessary to bring up a family and 
perpetuate ‘the race of such workmen’. (Smith 1976, i:.85)35  Marx noted 
this notion on the very first page of the ‘First Manuscript’ (Marx-Engels 
1975, 3: 235). He observes: ‘For it [political economy], therefore, the 
worker’s needs are but the one need – to maintain him whilst he is 
working and insofar as may be necessary to prevent the race of labourers 
from [dying] out. The wages of labour have thus exactly the same 
significance as the maintenance and servicing of any other productive 
instrument, or as the consumption of capital in general required for its 
reproduction with interest, like the oil which is applied to wheels to keep 
them turning.’. (Marx-Engels 1975, 3: 284)  
                                                 
34
 Marx uses the word ‘wages’ instead of the wage-system, but from the context it is clear that he 
means the latter.   
35
 It should be noted that while talking about the ‘subsistence’ wage, Smith always makes allowance 
for ‘custom and habit’ and what is ‘consistent with common humanity.’ (Smith, 1976, I: 86) 
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Smith had seen the principle of natural liberty or freedom in terms of the 
mobility of resources in the economy: the freedom of the capitalist to 
invest and sell wherever his private interest led him, and the freedom of 
the worker to choose his occupation and employer. Marx, drawing on the  
scientific aspect of Smith points to the relation between capital and labour 
and their respective ‘freedoms’, He quotes a French observer of the 
contemporary scene in Britain: ‘The worker is not at all in the position of 
a free seller vis-à-vis the one who employs him… The capitalist is always 
free to employ labour, and the worker always forced to sell it. The value 
of labour is completely destroyed if it is not sold every instant. Labour 
can neither be accumulated nor even be saved, unlike true [commodities]. 
(Marx-Engels 1975, 3: 245)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
We note that Marx’s indictment of capitalism goes beyond the concern 
for the material conditions of workers. Man does not live by bread alone. 
The indictment would stand even if these conditions were to improve and 
the worker was better off. Even if wage increases could be ‘enforced’, 
such an increase would be ‘nothing but better payment for the slave, and 
would not win either for the worker or for labour their human status and 
dignity.’ They would remain a ‘plaything of alien forces’. Thus, Marx is 
led to reject reform of capitalism, and measures aimed at ‘enforced’ 
increases in wages or ‘equality of wages’ as advocated by the French 
socialist Pierre Joseph Proudhon. (Marx-Engels 1975, 3: 280) Marx must 
reject capitalism and classical political economy’s liberal philosophy on 
the basis of his philosophical standpoint, just as he had rejected liberal 
political philosophy in the article ‘The Jewish Question’ (section 4 
above.)  
 
We note also another line of thinking, insofar as his indictment of 
capitalism and the critique of political economy is concerned. This relates 
to the internal problems of capitalism that classical political economy had 
either overlooked or chosen to ignore. Hegel, as we saw earlier, had made 
certain observations with regard to overproduction and increasing income 
inequality associated with capitalist development. In this respect Marx 
relies entirely on the commentaries of certain contemporary French and 
German writers who were drawing attention to the darker side of British 
industrial development. We get some indication of the view Marx is 
adopting from the following quotation he gives from the German writer 
Wilhelm Schulz: 
 
But even if it were true as it is false that the average income of every class of society has 
increased, the income-differences and relative income-distances may nevertheless have 
become greater and the contrasts between wealth and poverty accordingly stand out 
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more sharply. For just because total production rises – and in the same measure as it 
rises – needs, desires and claims also multiply and thus relative poverty can increase 
whilst absolute poverty diminishes. The Samoyed living on fish oil and rancid fish is not 
poor because in his secluded society all have the same needs.  But in a state that is forging 
ahead, which in the course of  a decade, say,  increased by a third its total production in 
proportion to the population, the worker who is getting as much at the end of ten years 
as at the beginning has not remained as well off, but has become poorer by a third. 
(Marx-Engels 1975, 3: 242)   
 
We may see here the beginning of the formation of Marx’s ‘increasing 
impoverishment’ thesis, We may also note that the complete synthesis of 
his philosophy with classical political economy would require a full 
merger of these two lines of thought.   
 
We referred earlier to the fact that in Smith’s system, economic 
development remained strictly within the frame of competitive capitalist 
relations. Marx took this to mean that in classical political economy the 
capitalist system was considered to be eternal. This view of the 
permanence of the capitalist system may be compared with Smith’s own 
understanding of historical development before the emergence of 
capitalism. In chapters 2 and 3 of Book three and chapter 1 of Book five 
of the Wealth of Nations, Smith traced human progress through four 
distinct stages identified as socio-economic organisational forms. The 
earliest form was based on hunting and food gathering, then came the 
society of shepherds (this is when private property first appeared); this 
was followed by the feudal society, which gave way to the contemporary 
commercial society or capitalism. (It is noteworthy that Smith identifies 
these different social organisational forms according to the nature of their 
economies or ‘modes of production’, as Marx would call them, thus 
anticipating a fundamental feature of Marx’s mature thought.) It seemed 
that with capitalism, in so far as socio-economic change was concerned, 
history had come to an end. Smith was taking the existing property 
relations as a given datum, not only for analysing the working of the 
capital economy (which was legitimate and necessary), but also for 
understanding historical development. This is how Marx saw it.   
 
Marx’s own mature theory of capitalist development, by contrast to the 
Smithian schema, will attempt to show that there are forces inherent in 
the logic of the capitalist economy that will drive its evolution beyond the 
bourgeois horizon set for it by classical political economy. He will reach 
this result through an internal critique of the classical theory.    
 
In the Manuscripts, Marx does not discuss the developmental aspects of 
the classical theory. But he does make an important discovery that will 
provide one of the important ingredients of his mature theory of capitalist 
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evolution. This observation refers to the concentration of capital in fewer 
and fewer hands as a necessary aspect of capital accumulation. Marx sees 
that Smithian competition is dynamic and has the tendency to undermine 
the competitive character of capitalism.  
 
Marx takes up this point in the section entitled ‘The accumulation of   
capitals and the competition among the capitalists’. (Marx-Engels 1975, 
3: 251) Here Marx quotes extensively from the Wealth of Nations (also 
from other writers). Of particular interest is the quotation from the 
‘Introduction’ to Book two of the Wealth of Nations where Smith 
discusses the relationship between capital accummulation, increase in the 
division of labour (in the plant) and increase in labour productivity. 
Implicit in this relationship is the phenomenon of economies of scale.
36
 
Marx recounts the numerous advantages that larger enterprises enjoy over 
smaller ones. In a competitive environment some enterprises will manage 
to get bigger and then, because of the advantages of size they enjoy, will 
begin to ‘squeeze’ the smaller ones out of the market. This is how, 
concentration of capital in fewer hands takes place: ‘Accumulation, when 
private property prevails, is the concentration of capital in the hands of 
the few, it is in general an inevitable consequence if capital is left to 
follow its natural course, and it is precisely through competition that the 
way is cleared for this natural disposition of capitals.’ (Marx-Engel 1975, 
3:251) With the concentration of capital, both in individual enterprises 
and regions comes, necessarily, the concentrations of labour, which, in 
turn, is a necessary condition for the development of working people’s 
class consciousness. These considerations, leading to the conviction that 
the ingredients for the transformation of capitalism lie within its own 
manner of functioning, its inherent logic, will come later in the 
development of Marx’s thought. But here, as noted, Marx has taken the   
first stop in this development.  
 
7. Concluding Remarks  
 
The Manuscripts of 1844 represent the first meeting point of the 
philosophical standpoint Marx had developed over the past twelve 
months or so and classical political economy as he found in the Wealth of 
Nations. We find here the beginning of Marx’s ‘critique of political 
economy’ or what I have referred to as the synthesis of Marx’s 
philosophical standpoint and classical political economy. On the basis of 
his philosophical standpoint, Marx rejected the liberal social philosophy 
of classical political economy, based on the principle of individualism, 
                                                 
36
 Rahim (2011: 98-100)   
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the separation of civil society from the state, the latter serving the needs 
of the former. In the writings of this period, Marx makes no attempt to 
systematically present his own vision of the ideal society he has in mind. 
Elements of this vision emerge through his critiques of others – Hegel, 
Feuerbach and, in the Manuscripts, of the classical theory. I have tried to 
identify these elements at each stage of his discussions. I have 
emphasised that the fundamental element here is the relation between the 
individual and society. One cannot be conceived without the other. Hence 
the rejection of dualism, the notion of the individual being split between 
his private self and social being. It is this standpoint that leads to the 
notion of the disappearance of the state, that is, the disappearance of the 
‘boundary post’ that separates the state and civil society, and man’s social 
being and his private self.  
 
I have distinguished the scientific aspect of Smith’s political economy 
from its liberal, individualistic philosophical aspect. In a fundamental 
sense the former was perfectly suited to Marx’s requirement, as it was 
determined by his philosophical position. There is no exaggeration in 
Marx’s striking utterance that political economy had merely formulated 
the laws of alienated labour. The central concept that Marx grasps in the 
political economy of Smith is the relationship between capital and labour 
– as classes, not as individuals. Henceforth, though Marx will still use the 
language of alienation, it is this relationship (as the embodiment of 
alienation) that will be central to his thought. Capital-labour relationship 
negates the notion of ‘freedom’ as it lies behind Smith’s principle of 
perfect liberty (except in its technical sense of the mobility of resources 
or perfect competition). The relationship between capital and labour, 
when seen in terms of classes, is one of unequals, and is fundamentally 
antagonistic. Capital is free to buy labour, labour forced to sell it. It is 
around this relationship in the process of production that Marx formulates 
his generalisation of the concept of alienation; it is this notion that now 
becomes rooted in the process of production, and in the relations of 
workers to each other, and to the capitalist.  
 
Implicit in my discussion is the suggestion that in future Marx’s problems 
with economic theory would arise entirely from his attempt to complete 
the synthesis referred to here. The economic process resulting in the self-
destruction of capitalism as an objective phenomenon must fit into his 
philosophical frame and conviction that capitalism must eventually give 
way to an altogether different kind of society – just as feudalism had 
given way to capitalism.  
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